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PREVIEW—Montana and Wyoming v. Washington: The Commerce
Clause and the Clean Water Act Collide Over Coal Exports
Rachel L. Wagner*
The Supreme Court of the United States has not scheduled oral
arguments for this matter. In October 2020, the Court asked for the federal
government’s views on the case but has not yet decided whether it will
exercise its jurisdiction over the challenge.
I. INTRODUCTION
Montana and Wyoming seek original jurisdiction in the Supreme
Court of the United States because the State of Washington denied a Clean
Water Act Section 401 permit for a private company’s proposed coal
export terminal in Washington. Montana and Wyoming v. Washington
asks whether Washington’s denial of port access to ship Montana and
Wyoming coal to foreign markets violates the Commerce Clause. Montana
and Wyoming assert that Washington’s discriminatory denial of the
Section 401 certification violates the Dormant Commerce and Foreign
Commerce clauses of the United States Constitution. Washington, in
response, argues that the permit denial was not discriminatory and was
denied because the proposed coal terminal project did not comply with
state law. This case is significant because litigation over a coal export
terminal is unfolding against a backdrop of extensive changes to the
Environmental Protection Agency’s interpretation of Section 401 and
could have broad impacts to Section 401 certification determinations
under state law.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Congress established the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) to “restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
Nations waters.”1 Under Section 401 of the CWA, any applicant for a
federal license or permit to conduct any activity that may result in any
discharge into navigable waters must provide the federal licensing or
permitting agency with a Section 401 certification.2 A discharge is defined
as “waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.”3 The
certification, issued by the state where the discharge originates, attests that
the discharge will comply with applicable provisions of certain
enumerated sections of the CWA. Section 401 provides states, certain
* Rachel L. Wagner, J.D. Candidate 2021, Alexander Blewett III School of
Law at the University of Montana.
1.
Clean Water Act § 101(a); 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2019).
2.
Id. § 1341. The statute defines “navigable waters” at CWA § 502(7);
33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
3.
33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
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tribes, and in certain circumstances, the EPA, the authority to: (1) grant,
(2) grant with conditions, (3) deny, or (4) waive certification of proposed
federal licenses or permits that may result in a discharge into waters of the
United States.4
This case arose after the State of Washington denied the necessary
CWA permit (“Section 401 Certification”) for a sublease of state-owned
aquatic lands to Lighthouse Resources, Inc., Lighthouse Products, LLC,
LHR Infrastructure, LLC, LHR Coal LLC, and Millennium Bulk
Terminals-Longview, LLC (collectively, “Lighthouse”) for a proposed
coal export terminal along the Columbia River in Cowlitz County,
Washington. Lighthouse proposed the so-called Millennium Bulk
Terminal (“Terminal”) to access foreign export markets for Wyoming and
Montana coal.5 The proposal would convert a former aluminum smelter
site into a terminal with the capacity to export 44 million metric tons of
coal per year.6 The Terminal would receive coal from the Powder River
Basin in Montana, Wyoming, and the Uinta Basin in Utah and Colorado
via rail shipment.7 The Terminal would receive, store, and load coal onto
ships, and the coal would then travel via the Columbia River and Pacific
Ocean to markets in Asia.8 Given the size of the project, Lighthouse
needed to obtain several federal, state, and local approvals.9
In 2012, Lighthouse applied for a Section 401 water quality
certification because the project may result in discharge into waters of the
United States, 33 U.S.C. § 1341. The CWA seeks to “recognize, preserve,
and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent,
reduce, and eliminate [water] pollution.”10 The permit application
triggered an environmental review under the Washington State
Environmental Policy Act (“SEPA”).11 Initially, the Washington
Department of Ecology (“Ecology”), Cowlitz County, and the United
States Army Corp of Engineers (“Corp”) sought to undertake a joint
Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”). Under Washington law,
agencies are required to assess the end use of products exported from
Washington ports.12 However, after Ecology demanded the EIS include an
analysis of the impact of global greenhouse gas emissions from coal in
foreign markets, the Corp decided not to participate in a joint EIS.

4.
Clean Water Act § 401(a)(1); 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).
5.
Northwest Alloys, Inc. v. Department of Natural Resources, 447 P.3d
620, 624 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019).
6.
Id.
7.
Millennium Bulk Terminals–Longview, Final SEPA Environmental
Impact Statement Summary, § S.1, p. S-1, https://perma.cc/27DR-67UX [hereinafter
“EIS Summary”].
8.
EIS Summary, § S.1, p. S-1, https://perma.cc/27DR-67UX.
9.
Def. Br. In Opp. at 4, June 22, 2020, No. 220152.
10.
33 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(2020).
11.
Pls’ Br. In Supp. at 9, Jan. 21, 2020, No. 220152 (citing Rev. Code
Wash. 43.21C et seq.).
12.
Wash. Admin. Code 197–11–060(4)(b).
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The EIS, jointly published by Ecology and Cowlitz County in
2017, identified nine potential environmental impacts that could result
from construction and operation of the Terminal.13 The EIS concluded
“[t]here would be no unavoidable and significant adverse environmental
impacts on water quality.”14 Except for the unmitigable potential impact
on air quality, the EIS determined that mitigation efforts could resolve
potential environmental impacts.15 Cowlitz County issued a report
recommending approval of Lighthouse’s permit application, with several
mitigation conditions.16
Following the EIS, Ecology continued with its review of
Lighthouse’s Section 401 Certification application to determine whether
its proposal conformed with Washington’s water quality requirements.17
Generally, if water quality issues remain unresolved by the Section 401
certification deadline, Ecology’s practice is to deny the certification
“without prejudice.”18 A letter drafted but never sent by Ecology staff
stated that denying the application “without prejudice would not in any
way preclude [Lighthouse] from resubmitting a request for a [water quality
certification] at a later date.”19 However, despite the drafted letter, Ecology
subsequently denied Lighthouse’s application “with prejudice.”20 The
“with prejudice” denial precluded Lighthouse from resubmitting its
application. Washington denied Lighthouse’s application for a Section
401 permit on the following two grounds: (1) the Terminal’s “significant
unavoidable adverse impacts” identified in the EIS conflicted with SEPA
policies; and (2) Washington did not have reasonable assurance that the
Terminal would meet water quality standards.21 The denial was based on
Ecology’s discretionary authority under SEPA.22 Lighthouse appealed the
Ecology’s denial, but the Pollution Control Hearings Board affirmed the
permit denial, and the Washington Court of Appeals affirmed.23
On January 21, 2020, Montana and Wyoming filed a motion
requesting that the United States Supreme Court review Ecology’s denial
of the CWA certification. In July 2020, several months after the parties
submitted briefs in this matter, the EPA issued a final water quality
13.
Pls’ Br. In Supp. at 9.
14.
Id. at 11.
15.
Id.
16.
Id.
17.
Pls’ Br. In Supp. At 11; Order on Defendants’ and Intervenor Motions
for Partial Summary Judgment at *2, Lighthouse Res. Inc. v. Inslee, No. 3:18-cv05005-RJB, 2018 WL 6505372 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 2018).
18.
Pls’ Br. In Supp. at 11.
19.
Id.
20.
Id. at 12; Def’s Br. In Resp. at 8 (citing Lighthouse Res. Inc. v. Inslee,
No. 3:18-c-05005-RJB, 2018 WL 6505372 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 11, 2018).
21.
Pls’ Br. in Supp. at 12.
22.
Id.
23.
Def’s Br. In Resp. (citing Order on Defendants’ and the IntervenorDefendants’ Motions for Partial Summary Judgment at *2, Lighthouse Res. Inc., 2018
WL 6505372).
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certification rule (“2020 Final Rule”) that went into effect on September
11, 2020, and replaced the prior implementing regulations from 1971.24
The 2020 Final Rule includes numerous changes to existing regulation and
practice that narrow the authority of states when acting on Section 401
certification requests. The 2020 Final Rule limits the application of
Section 401 to point source discharges into waters of the United States.25
The changes in the 2020 Final Rule also narrow the scope of review and
conditions to focus on water quality requirements, specifically excluding
consideration of other non-water-quality impacts.26
III. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The parties disagree on whether the Court has original jurisdiction
to hear the controversy, and more importantly, whether Washington’s
denial of a Section 401 permit for the Terminal violates the Dormant
Commerce Clause and the Foreign Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution. This case will likely turn on the Court’s analysis of the
parties’ Dormant Commerce Clause arguments.
A. Plaintiffs’ Arguments
Plaintiffs argue the Court should exercise its original jurisdiction
because Washington’s alleged discrimination against Montana and
Wyoming coal is costing the states millions in taxes and revenue––a direct
injury impacting Montana’s and Wyoming’s sovereign interests. Plaintiffs
contend that Washington’s denial of the Section 401 Certification resulted
in a discriminatory closure of Washington’s ports to coal from Montana
and Wyoming, in violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause and the
Foreign Commerce Clause.27 Plaintiffs allege that by denying Section 401
certification, Washington blocked the construction of the port based on its
desire to protect exports of Washington agricultural products over out-ofstate coal and an unjustified concern about the extraterritorial effect on
greenhouse gas emissions from shipping coal to overseas markets.28
Plaintiffs argue that Washington’s denial of the Section 401 Certification
24.
Clean Water Act Section 401 Certification Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 42210,
July 13, 2020 [hereinafter “2020 Final Rule”].
25.
Id. at 42234.
26.
Id. at 42256. In the preamble to the 2020 Final Rule, EPA stated the
agency is “aware of circumstances in which some States have denied certifications on
grounds that are unrelated to water quality requirements and that are beyond the scope
of CWA section 401.” However, since the 2020 Final Rule, President Joe Biden issued
an Executive Order titled “Protecting Public Health and the Environment and
Restoring Science to Tackle the Climate Crisis,” which directed certain agency actions
to be reviewed, including the July 13, 2020 CWA 401 Certification Rule. Even if the
new rule remains in effect, litigation surrounding implementation of Section 401 will
likely continue.
27.
Bill of Complaint, Montana & Wyoming v. Washington, No. 220152,
¶ 1 (U.S. Jan. 21, 2020).
28.
Id. ¶¶ 39, 44, 49.
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for those reasons imposes a burden on interstate commerce and constitutes
an impermissible attempt to regulate conduct outside its borders in
violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause.29 Plaintiffs also allege the
Section 401 denial impedes their ability to engage in foreign commerce
and infringes on the federal government’s exclusive authority to regulate
foreign commerce, in violation of the Foreign Commerce Clause.30

1. The Supreme Court’s Original Jurisdiction
Plaintiffs argue that the “seriousness and dignity” of their claims,
and the lack of an alternative forum to litigate the issues and provide
appropriate relief, warrants the Court’s original jurisdiction.31 Plaintiffs
assert Washington’s complete bar on their access to an international
shipping port and resulting loss of severance tax and coal production
revenue implicate important sovereign interests.32 Moreover, Plaintiffs’
claim that Washington’s discriminatory denial of the Section 401
Certification for the coal terminal violates the Dormant Commerce Clause
and the Foreign Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution is
sufficient to invoke the Court’s original jurisdiction.33

2. Washington’s Dormant Commerce Clause Violations
Plaintiffs argue Washington’s treatment of the Section 401
Certification is unconstitutional because its effect favors Washington’s
economic interests over Montana’s and Wyoming’s.34 Plaintiffs further
contend Washington’s Section 401 Certification denial was motivated by
political reasons, and the Dormant Commerce Clause prevents a state from
interfering with interstate commerce based on political and extra-territorial
concerns.35
Plaintiffs assert that Washington denied the Section 401
Certification for pretextual reasons and that Washington’s true motive was
to benefit its own economic interests in violation of the Dormant
Commerce Clause.36 Plaintiffs rely on cases in which the Court
emphasized the principle that states are not permitted to “promote [their]
own economic advantages by curtailment or burdening of interstate
commerce.”37 Plaintiffs present evidence that Washington “publicly
stated” it denied the Section 401 Certification, in part, to protect its
29.
Id. ¶¶ 48–57.
30.
Bill of Complaint, Montana & Wyoming v. Washington, No. 220152,
¶¶ 59–65 (U.S. Jan. 21, 2020).
31.
Pls’ Br. In Supp. at 18, Jan. 21, 2020, No. 220152.
32.
Id. at 19.
33.
Id. at 21.
34.
Id. at 25.
35.
Id. at 28.
36.
Id. at 24.
37.
Id. at 25 (citing H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525
(1949)).
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economic interests.38 Specifically, Plaintiffs explain, Washington
explicitly denied the permit because “[i]ncreased coal trains from the
[Terminal] proposal would compete with rail shipments of other goods,
including Washington’s important agricultural products.”39 Therefore,
Plaintiffs argue, Washington’s overt economic protectionism is per se
invalid because it is in contrast to the Commerce Clause and the Court’s
precedent interpreting it.40
Plaintiffs further argue the Dormant Commerce Clause is as
concerned with the “practical effects” of state action as it is with economic
protectionism.41 Plaintiffs assert local governments in California and
Oregon have joined forces with Washington to block West Coast port
access to export coal.42 This politically motivated hostility, and
“gate[keeping] of the national economy,” Plaintiffs contend, is prohibited
by the Dormant Commerce Clause because it constricts the flow of
commerce.43 Plaintiffs specifically claim that Washington Governor Jay
Inslee and his political campaign to “control global greenhouse gas
emissions” was the driving force to ensure his appointees denied the
permit––with prejudice––for the coal export terminal.44 Plaintiffs assert
that Washington law––which explicitly requires that agencies consider a
product’s end use, and the impact that use has beyond the State’s borders–
–is an unconstitutional extension of its police power beyond its
jurisdictional bounds.45 Consequently, according to Plaintiffs,
Washington’s politically motivated permit denial had the practical effect
of restricting the free-flow of commerce, and therefore triggered a
violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause.46

38.
Id.
39.
Id. Plaintiffs also cite other statements by Washington, such as the
“Millennium proposal would only ship coal, there would be no [Washington] apples,”
and “Aerospace brings thousands of jobs with those emissions; coal export doesn’t.”
40.
Id. at 25–26 (see Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624
(1978)).
41.
Id. at 26 (citing Brown Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor
Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 583 (1986)).
42.
Id. at 27 (citing Bill Lucia, With West Coast States Blocking Coal
Export Projects, Proponents Keep Pushing, ROUTE FIFTY (Nov. 19, 2019),
https://perma.cc/MJ66-5BEA).
43.
Id.
44.
Id. at 28 (citing E-mails RE: Gov’s call with Boeing on July 25 and
ghg emission triggers (Mar. 2, 2013–July 24, 2013)).
45.
Pls’ Br. in Resp., at 10, June 22, 2020, No. 220152; Pls’ Br. in Supp.
at 29.
46.
Pls’ Br. In Supp. at 31. To supports their claim, Plaintiffs cite to
Governor Inslee’s oral statement that Washington-based Boeing would not face
similar scrutiny as the coal export terminal because it’s a “very different commodity
than coal” and that he would expect a “much different SEPA approach [to] apply to a
proposed [Boeing] project.”
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3. Washington’s Alleged Foreign Commerce Clause Violation
Finally, Plaintiffs argue Washington’s denial of the Section 401
Certification to prevent the construction of a coal port violates the Foreign
Commerce Clause because it “implicates foreign policy issues which must
be left to the Federal government [and] violates a clear federal directive.”47
Plaintiffs rely on Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,48 to further its
position that foreign commerce is “a matter of national concern” that
“requires the Nation to speak with ‘one voice.’”49 This need for federal
uniformity, Plaintiffs argue, makes state restrictions on foreign commerce
subject to “rigorous and searching scrutiny.”50
Plaintiffs contend the United States has an unambiguous foreign
policy to support coal export.51 Plaintiffs cite to remarks by former
President Trump at the “Unleashing American Energy Event” and a 2017
Executive Order to support their claim that the United States has expressed
a clear position on the benefits of exporting coal to foreign markets to the
American economy and national security.52 Moreover, Plaintiffs rely on a
report issued by the U.S. Secretary of Energy that recommended
developing West Coast terminal capacity.53 The report noted the “limited
capacity of export terminals has greatly limited the ability to export”
coal.54
Plaintiffs also argue a strong export market for coal is not limited
to the Trump Administration’s foreign policy. Plaintiffs’ assert that
President Obama thought coal export was important––especially coal
export to Asia.55 Thus, Plaintiffs contend, the United States has a history
of expressing an unambiguous foreign policy to support coal exports.
Consequently, Washington’s decision to block Plaintiffs from developing
a coal export terminal prevents them from accessing foreign markets and
prevents the “United States from speaking with ‘one voice,’ and
contravenes clear federal directive.”56
47.
Id. at 32 (quoting Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463
U.S. 159, 194 (1983)).
48.
441 U.S. 434 (1979).
49.
Id. at 31 (internal citations omitted).
50.
Id. at 32 (citing South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467
U.S. 82, 100 (1984)); see also Kraft Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep’t of Revenue and Fin.,
505 U.S. 71, 79 (1992).
51.
Id.
52.
Id. (citing Remarks by President Trump at the Unleashing American
Energy Event (June 29, 2017), https://perma.cc/HS43-Z9PK; Executive Order 13783
(March 28, 2017)).
53. Id. at 33 (citing Letter from Rick Perry to Greg Workman, (January
7, 2018), https://perma.cc/P993-YA6U).
54.
Id. at 33 (citing Advancing U.S. Coal Exports, National Coal Council,
2–10 (Oct. 22, 2018), https://perma.cc/MR7C-RJE7).
55.
Id. at 34 (quoting David Frenthold and Michael Shear, As Obama
Visits Coal Country, Many Are Wary of His Environmental Policies, WASHINGTON
POST (Apr. 25, 2010)).
56.
Id.
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B. Defendant’s Arguments
Washington argues that Congress expressly authorized states to
deny certification under CWA Section 401, and so Plaintiffs may not
challenge the denial under the Dormant Commerce Clause.57 Washington
further argues that the Section 401 denial does not amount to an embargo
against coal from Plaintiffs because millions of tons of coal already move
through Washington, including at the site of the proposed terminal.58
Washington also disputes Plaintiffs’ allegation that the Section 401
Certification denial was protectionist and discriminatory by stating the
denial was neutral and not motivated economic protectionism.59 Finally,
Washington contends that the Section 401 Certification denial does not
violate the Foreign Commerce Clause for the same reasons it does not
violate the Dormant Commerce Clause, and also because it does not affect
the federal government’s ability to speak with one voice when regulating
foreign commerce.60
1. The Court’s Original Jurisdiction and Standing
First, Washington argues the Court should not exercise its original
jurisdiction because the nature of Plaintiffs’ interest, the “seriousness and
dignity of the claim,” and the availability of an alternative forum in which
the issue can be resolved weigh against the Supreme Court exercising its
original jurisdiction.61
Next, Washington asserts Plaintiffs do not have standing because
the harm they allege is speculative.62 Because Plaintiffs are not the “object
of the government action or inaction” they challenge, Washington asserts
standing is more difficult to establish.63 Washington argues Plaintiffs will
not lose tax revenue because coal mined in Montana and Wyoming will
not be barred from reaching Asian markets.64 Rather, Washington alleges
Plaintiffs inappropriately rely on projected tax revenues from the export
of coal to Asian markets65 because a high volume of coal exports from the
57.
Def’s Br. in Opp’n for Mot. for Leave to File Compl., Montana &
Wyoming v. Washington, No. 220152, at 20–21 (U.S. Jan. 21, 2020) (quoting Maine
v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986), and Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. Of Governors of
Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 174 (1985)).
58.
Def’s Br. In Opp’n at 23–27.
59.
Id. at 27–33.
60.
Id. at 34. Washington also argues that the case is not appropriate for
Supreme Court review because the denial of a Section 401 certification “does not
directly implicate any other States’ sovereign or quasi-sovereign interests” but instead
is “at its core . . . a challenge to the denial of a private company’s permit application
to build a privately owned project.”
61.
Id. at 16.
62.
Id. at 17.
63.
Id. (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562
(1992)).
64.
Id.
65.
Id. at 18.
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United States to Asia is not projected after 2017 as the global economy
shifts to renewable energy.66
2. Dormant Commerce Clause Claim
Washington argues Plaintiffs’ Commerce Clause claims suffer
from three fatal flaws: (1) Congress expressly authorizes states to deny
Clean Water Act permits that violate state law; (2) Plaintiffs improperly
rely on the premise that Washington has “placed an embargo on coal” from
Montana and Wyoming; and (3) Plaintiffs’ argument that Washington’s
decision to deny a permit was motivated by economic protectionism
“makes no sense” and does not align with the record.67
Washington claims Ecology denied the Section 401 Certification
because Lighthouse did not comply with state water quality standards.68
The agency’s denial, Washington argues, is merely an exercise of
Congress’ delegated authority to the states—authority to deny certification
under Section 401 where state water quality standards are not met.69 To
support its claim, Washington relies on the Order Denying Section 401
Water Certification to cite several water quality violations including:
Lighthouse’s failure to submit a wetlands mitigation plan; failure to submit
adequate “wastewater characterization and treatment data;” failure to
show it complied with the required methods of treating wastewater; failure
to comply with Washington’s antidegradation requirements; and failure to
provide enough information about “potential toxic discharges to the
Columbia River.”70 Because this denial implements the CWA,
Washington asserts, this implementation of federal law does not violate
the Dormant Commerce Clause.71
Washington relies on state law to argue that approving the
Terminal conflicts with SEPA.72 Citing CWA Section 401, Washington
contends Ecology did not have reasonable assurance the project would
meet “both applicable water quality standards and any other appropriate
requirements of state law.”73 Citing the EIS, Washington articulated nine
environmental resource areas that would suffer significant adverse
environmental impacts if Lighthouse moved forward with the Terminal.74
The EIS identified impacts on two resource areas that implicate water
66.
Id. (citing Ian Goodman, Expert Report on Millennium Bulk
Terminals-Longview/Lighthouse (Goodman, Expert Report) at 37 (Table 5), 198
(Nov. 14, 2018).
67.
Id. at 20.
68.
Id.
69.
Id.
70.
Id. at 22.
71.
Id.
72.
Id. at 23.
73.
Id. (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d); PUD 1 of Jefferson County v.
Washington State Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 711–13 (1994)).
74.
Def. Br. In Opp. at 22, June 22, 2020, No. 220152 (citing Order
Denying Section 401 Water Quality Certification at 10–11, 12–13).
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quality, namely, increased traffic on the Columbia River, and impacts on
“aquatic habitat, fish survival, and tribal fishing and treaty rights.”75
Consequently, Washington argues, it should not have to set aside water
quality laws—that Congress explicitly authorized—just so Lighthouse can
build a coal export terminal.76
Second, Washington argues its Section 401 Certification denial is
not an embargo on Montana and Wyoming coal because, each year, coal
from these states “pass[es] through Washington for export.”77 Washington
notes that there is capacity for exporting coal at existing ports because “of
the lack of demand for coal, not because of any imagined ‘embargo.’”78
Citing Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Obersly, which held that a Delaware law
did not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause because it did not prohibit
the export of coal and was not discriminatory, Washington argues that
even if Plaintiffs are unable to export as much coal as they would like
because of the permit denial, it does not violate the Commerce Clause
because it does not prevent the movement of coal through the State or the
export of coal to Asia.79
Washington argues that Plaintiffs have no evidence Washington
discriminatorily denied the Section 401 permit to benefit in-state
industries in the same market––here, Washington agricultural products.80
Even if Plaintiffs had actual evidence of Washington’s economic
protectionism, Washington asserts they have not provided any case law or
authority to support their claim.81 Again relying on Norfolk, Washington
wields the Court’s reasoning to further its argument that differential
treatment of industries does not violate the Dormant Commerce Clause.82
Rather, as articulated in Norfolk, “[t]he Supreme Court has never adopted
such a broad gauged view of a discriminatory effect; it has found . . .
discriminatory effects only where the state law advantages in-state
business in relation to out-of-state business in the same market.”83
Moreover, Washington argues that the permit application was not
denied—as clearly articulated in Ecology’s Order—because it favored instate industry or disfavored out-of-state industry.84 Washington argues the
decision to deny the permit was “on its face neutral,” and cites Minnesota
v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.,85 to assert the Court should defer to the
stated reasons for the denial unless those reasons “could not have been a
goal” of the finding.86
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 24.
Id.
Id. (citing 822 F.2d 388 (3d Cir. 1987)).
Id. at 27–28.
Id. at 28.
Id.
Id. (quoting Norfolk, 822 F.2d at 402) (emphasis added).
Id. at 29.
Id. (citing 449 U.S. 456, 463 n.7, 471 n.15 (1981)).
Id.
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Finally, Washington argues Plaintiffs’ assertion—that Governor
Inslee “commandeered” the approval process—is baseless.87 First, relying
on testimony by the Director of Ecology, Washington points out the
Director testified that “she did not rely on greenhouse gas emissions in
making [her decision] nor did she harbor any ‘anti-coal’ bias.”88 Similarly,
the EIS did not cite greenhouse gas emissions among the project’s
significant adverse impacts.89 Thus, Washington argues, because each
state has “substantial latitude to ensure the health, safety, and welfare of
its residents, and to protect its environment and natural resources,”
Plaintiffs’ characterization of a Section 401 denial as a “political and moral
judgment” on other states is flawed. Moreover, Washington argues, the
only type of discrimination that matters under the Commerce Clause is
“differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that
benefits the former and burden[s] the latter.”90 Here, Washington
concludes, there is no evidence of such differential treatment.91
3. Foreign Commerce Clause Claim
Washington argues its Section 401 permit denial does not violate
the Foreign Commerce Clause for the same reasons it does not violate the
Dormant Commerce Clause. However, Washington expands on its
Dormant Commerce Clause argument, asserting its denial of the Section
401 Certification for the Terminal does not affect the federal government’s
ability to “speak with one voice” regarding foreign commerce.92
Washington argues it is not the “unambiguous foreign policy of
the United States to support coal export.”93 Washington criticizes
Plaintiffs’ reliance on a “speech by the President, an Executive Order that
never mentions exports, and an advisory committee report prepared by
coal industry representatives,” stating this is “hardly evidence” of an
“unambiguous foreign policy” supporting coal exports.94
Even if there were a clear federal policy, Washington asserts, its
denial would not contradict the policy because the State determined “this
particular project at this particular location” cannot be approved under
state and federal water quality laws.95 The permit denial does not block the
export of coal through other terminals, nor does it block Plaintiffs’ access
to foreign markets.96
87.
Id.
88.
Id. at 30.
89.
Id. (citing Millennium, 2020 WL 1651475, at *2).
90.
Id. at 33 (citing Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Oregon Dep’t of Envtl.
Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)).
91.
Id. at 30.
92.
Id. at 34 (citing Japan Line Ltd. v. Los Angeles County, 441 U.S. 434,
449 (1979)).
93.
Id. at 35.
94.
Id.
95.
Id. at 36.
96.
Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS
The fundamental issue in this case is whether Washington
regulators violated the Dormant Commerce and Foreign Commerce
clauses when it denied a Section 401 permit for the Terminal project in
Longview, Washington. A ruling in favor of Montana and Wyoming could
support EPA’s contention that the scope of Section 401 certification is
narrow, and thus would strengthen EPA’s position in the cases challenging
the 2020 Final Rule. Furthermore, while Washington denied Lighthouse’s
water quality certification application and Montana and Wyoming filed
their complaint before EPA issued the 2020 Final Rule, EPA’s recent
criticism of broader-based certification denials may encourage the Court
to scrutinize more closely the basis for Washington’s denial of the Section
401 Certification. On the other hand, a ruling in favor of Washington may,
if it addresses the appropriate scope of certification review, lead district
courts to view the 2020 Final Rule with greater skepticism.
A. The Court’s Original Jurisdiction and Standing
The Court will likely find that Plaintiffs have standing to sue
because Washington’s denial of the Section 401 Certification directly
affects Plaintiffs’ ability to collect severance tax revenues from its coal
extraction and its injury is substantial enough to establish standing.
Moreover, this case is appropriate for the Court’s original jurisdiction
because Plaintiffs’ claims involve the transportation of natural resources
and there is not an alternative forum to hear the dispute. In deciding
whether to grant leave to file a complaint in a dispute arising under the
Court’s original jurisdiction, the Court examines two factors: (1) “the
interest of the complaining State, focusing on the seriousness and dignity
of the claim;” and (2) “the availability of an alternative forum in which the
issue tendered may be resolved.”97 The Court has previously entertained
several cases among states involving Commerce Clause claims,
specifically in cases involving the transportation or taxation of natural
resources.98 Here, because the case involves Commerce Clause claims
involving the transportation of natural resources, the first prong is easily
met.
Additionally, there is no other forum in which Plaintiffs’ interests
will find an appropriate hearing and full relief. Under the second
jurisdictional factor, the Court examines whether there is another forum
where “there is jurisdiction over the named parties, where the issues
tendered may be litigated, and where appropriate relief may be had.”99
Congress vested the Court with “original and exclusive jurisdiction of all
controversies between two or more States.”100 Here, although private
97.
98.
99.
100.

Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73, 77 (1992).
Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992).
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93 (1972).
28 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
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parties in the litigation in the Western District of Washington raised a
Commerce Clause challenge to Washington’s denial of the Section 401
Certification, the litigation is not a “pending action” and Congress’
description of the Court’s jurisdiction as exclusive for cases between states
denies jurisdiction of such cases to another federal court.101 Moreover,
even if the Court determines the litigation is a “pending action,” it is likely
the Court will hold that Plaintiffs’ interests would not be directly
represented in another forum.102
The Court will likely find Plaintiffs have standing. To constitute a
proper controversy under the Court’s original jurisdiction, “it must appear
that the complaining [s]tate has suffered a wrong through the action of the
other [s]tate, furnishing ground for judicial redress, or is asserting a right
against the other [s]tate which is susceptible of judicial enforcement
according to the accepted principles of the common law or equity systems
of jurisprudence.”103 Moreover, when a plaintiff is not the object of the
government action or inaction it challenges, standing is “substantially
more difficult” to establish.104 The Court finds a direct injury when one
state merely reduces another state’s ability to collect severance tax
revenues.105 In Wyoming, because Oklahoma’s law directly affected
Wyoming’s ability to collect severance tax revenues, its claimed injury
was substantial and the Court’s original jurisdiction proper.106 Like
Wyoming, Washington’s denial of the Section 401 Certification directly
affects Plaintiffs’ ability to collect severance tax revenues from its coal
extraction and its injury is substantial enough to establish standing.
B. Dormant Commerce Clause
In its analysis of the Dormant Commerce Clause issue, the Court
will likely consider two arguments. On one hand, as Plaintiffs contend,
Washington’s Section 401 Certification denial restricts the free-flow of
goods across state lines and allows a single state to dictate the terms of
interstate commerce based on its own political and economic interests—
implicating the core reasons the Dormant Commerce Clause exists.107 On
the other hand, as Washington argues, Congress expressly and
unambiguously authorized states to deny certification under Section 401
of the CWA where state water quality standards are not met.108

101. Mississippi, 506 U.S. at 77–78.
102. Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 437.
103. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 735–36 (quoting
Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 15 (1939)).
104. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992) (quoting
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984)).
105. Wyoming, 502 U.S. at 451.
106. Id. at 452.
107. Pls’ Br. In Supp. at 22, Jan. 21, 2020, No. 220152.
108. Def. Br. In Opp’n at 21, June 22, 2020, No. 220152 (citing 33 U.S.C.
§ 1341(a); S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. Of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 380 (2006)).
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Washington’s strongest argument is that Ecology did what
Congress authorized it to do by denying Section 401 certification because
the Terminal proposal did not comply with state water quality standards.109
If the Court accepts this argument, Ecology’s implementation of federal
law would not offend the Dormant Commerce Clause.110 The Court will
likely agree with Washington’s assertion that Ecology’s Section 401
denial was expressly authorized by Congress in the CWA, but will likely
give substantial weight to Plaintiffs assertion that Washington’s denial of
the Section 401 Certification was discriminatory. The Court’s evaluation
of whether Washington’s denial of the Section 401 Certification was to
protect its economic and political interests will likely hinge on its
interpretation of the evidence presented by the parties and the Court’s
willingness to expand the scope of its Dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence.
The Court will likely find that Washington facially discriminated
against Plaintiffs by denying the Section 401 Certification because it did
not treat in-state and out-of-state business equally and discriminated
against Montana and Wyoming coal. The Court will likely reject
Washington’s argument that none of the reasons set forth in Ecology’s
order denying the application has anything to do with favoring in-state
industry or disfavoring out-of-state industry because its exclusive focus is
protecting state water quality and the health, safety, and welfare of
Washington citizens. Instead, the Court will likely scrutinize the extensive
record presented by Plaintiffs in which Washington officials state a
preference for its agricultural products, industry, and less scrutiny in its
SEPA review for in-state projects. Like Philadelphia v. New Jersey, where
the Court invalidated a New Jersey law prohibiting the importation of
waste that originated outside the territorial limits of the State, the Court
will likely find the record supports Washington’s intention to slow or
freeze the flow of coal importation for protectionist reasons.111 The Court
will likely agree with Plaintiffs and view the evidence in this case as a
“rare instance where a state artlessly discloses an avowed purpose to
discriminate against interstate goods.”112 An examination of the
circumstances here will weigh in favor of the Court finding the Section
401 Certification for water quality reasons “could not have been the goal”
of the purported denial.113
However, even if the Court agrees with Washington and does not
accept Plaintiffs’ argument that the purpose of Washington’s denial was
motivated by economic reasons to protect its agricultural interests, the
109. Id. at 21–22 (citing Order Denying Section 401 Water Quality
Certification at 14–19).
110. Id. at 22.
111. 437 U.S. 617, 628 (1978).
112. Pls’ Br. in Resp., at 25, June 22, 2020, No. 220152 (citing Hunt v.
Washington State Apple Advertising Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977) (quoting
Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951)).
113. Def. Br. In Opp’n at 29, June 22, 2020, No. 220152 (citing Minnesota
v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463 n.7, 471 n.15 (1981)).
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Court will still likely find the effect of Washington’s decision to be
discriminatory. Washington’s strongest argument on this issue is that the
Section 401 Certification denial does not prevent Montana and Wyoming
coal exports through existing ports.114 However, the Court will likely find
Plaintiffs’ assertion, that no state has the power to “burden or constrict”
the flow of commerce, persuasive.115
The Court will likely reject Washington’s reliance on Norfolk
Southern Corp.116 Instead, the Court will likely find two cases—Hunt and
C&A Carbone—clearly establish that a facially neutral state action, such
as the Section 401 Certification denial at issue here, is discriminatory if
there is proof of a discriminatory impact.117
In Hunt, the Court found discrimination based on the disparate
impact of a law against out of staters.118 A North Carolina law required
that all closed containers of apples sold or shipped into the state bare “no
grade other than applicable U.S. grade or standard.”119 The Court found
that the law was facially neutral in that all apples sold in the state—
whether produced in state or out of state—had to comply with this rule.
Nonetheless, the Court held that the law had the practical effect of
burdening and discriminating against the sale of Washington apples.120
Here, like Hunt, the Court will likely weigh whether the effect of
Washington’s Section 401 Certification denial discriminates against
Montana and Wyoming coal while protecting Washington agriculture and
in-state industries. However, unlike Hunt, the Court will be required to
determine whether a Dormant Commerce Clause violation can be based
on favoring one industry over another—here, denying a Section 401
certification to build a terminal to preserve rail capacity for Washington
agricultural products—as opposed to favoring in-state participants over
out-of-state participants in the same industry. Despite this distinction, the
Court will likely scrutinize the record to determine whether the
discriminatory impact on Montana and Wyoming coal was not an
unintended byproduct of a neutral Section 401 Certification denial.
The Court also found discrimination based on the disparate impact
of a facially neutral law in C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown.121
There, a city adopted an ordinance that required all nonhazardous solid
waste in the town to be deposited at a transfer station. The law allowed
recyclers to continue to receive solid waste, but they had to bring their

114. Id. at 23.
115. Pls’ Br. In Supp. at 27–28, Jan. 21, 2020, No. 220152 (citing H.P.
Hood & Sons, 336 U.S. at 533).
116. Def’s Br. In Opp’n at 26; Norfolk v. Oberly, 822 F.2d 388, 401 (3d
Cir. 1987).
117. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 351
(1977); C&A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 391 (1994).
118. Norfolk, 822 F.2d at 351.
119. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 339.
120. Id. at 351.
121. 511 U.S. 383, 391 (1994).
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nonrecyclables to the transfer station.122 The Court deemed the law
discriminatory because of its effect on out-of-staters. The Court will likely
be persuaded by Plaintiffs’ reliance on C&A Carbone to further its
argument that “[f]or a State to deny a permit based on factors ‘it might
deem harmful to the environment’ is illegitimate and ‘would extend the
[State’s] police power beyond its jurisdictional bounds.’”123
Because the Court will likely find Washington’s Section 401
Certification denial discriminatory, and there is a strong presumption
against discriminatory state action, it is unlikely Washington will be
successful in articulating an important purpose.
C. Foreign Commerce Clause Claims
The Supreme Court has only considered a few cases implicating
the Foreign Commerce Clause.124 As foreign commerce in the globalized
economy reaches deeper inside state boundaries to touch local activity,
and as the United States more aggressively projects a wide assortment of
public and private laws to activity outside its borders, this is likely to
change. However, it is unlikely the Supreme Court will hear this issue and
will instead focus on the Dormant Commerce Clause claim. However, if
it does, the Court will likely focus its analysis on whether the Section 401
Certification denial interferes with the federal government’s ability to
“speak with one voice with regard to commercial relations with foreign
governments.”125
Plaintiffs’ strongest argument on this issue is that the federal
government has made its position clear that exporting coal to Asia and
other global markets is important to the American economy and protecting
national security.126 Like its Dormant Commerce Clause analysis, the
Court will likely agree with Washington’s assertion that the Department
of Ecology’s Section 401 denial was expressly authorized by Congress in
the CWA, but the Court will likely give substantial weight to Plaintiffs’
assertion that Washington’s denial of the permit was discriminatory.
Therefore, it is likely the Court will find the permit denial violates the
Foreign Commerce Clause.

122. Id.
123. Pls’ Br. In Supp. at 20, Jan. 21, 2020, No. 220152; C&A Carbone,
511 U.S. at 393 (citing Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935)).
124. The most important of these cases is Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of
Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
125. Japan Line Ltd., 441 U.S. at 449.
126. Pl’s Br. In Supp. at 32 (citing Remarks by President Trump at the
Unleashing American Energy Event (June 29, 2017), https://perma.cc/HS43-Z9PK);
see also Executive order 13783 (Mar. 28, 2017); David Farenthold and Michael Shear,
As Obama Visits Coal Country, Many Are Wary of His Environmental Policies,
WASHINGTON POST (Apr. 25, 2010); Advancing U.S. Coal Exports An Assessment of
Opportunities to Enhance U.S. Coal, NATIONAL COAL COUNCIL, https://perma.cc/
L9CV-L5PA).
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V. CONCLUSION
The Court will likely find Washington’s denial of the Section 401
Certification to be discriminatory and in violation of the Dormant
Commerce and Foreign Commerce clauses. Whether the Court determines
the purpose of Washington’s denial of the Section 401 Certification was
to protect its economic and political interests will likely hinge on its
interpretation of the evidence presented by the parties and the Court’s
willingness to expand the scope of its Dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. Nonetheless, the Court will likely find the effect of
Washington’s decision to be discriminatory. At a minimum, the Court’s
holding in this case will provide guidance to states on the scope of its
permitting authority under Section 401 of the CWA.

